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STATEMENT OF THE C~SE
Nature of the Case
Arnold Dean Anderson appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction.
He asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures, protected by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.
substance,

After being found guilty by a jury of felony possession of a controlled
methamphetamine,

as well

as

a

persistent violator enhancement,

Mr. Anderson was sentenced to ten years, with three years fixed.
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress the fruits of an unlawful search of his vehicle. Mr. Anderson asserts that the
totality of the circumstances known to the Officer at the time he searched the vehicle did
not yield probable cause because there was no reasonable likelihood that evidence of
further criminality would be found. Thus, the State failed to show a valid justification for
the warrantless search of the interior of Mr. Anderson's vehicle.

Furthermore,

Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case, and that the
district court erred in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional information
submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately nine o'clock in the evening on January 6, 2013, Officer Joel
Woodward saw a car parked at an odd angle, with the front of the vehicle up on the
sidewalk. (2/11/13 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.7, L. 11.) Officer Woodward drove around the block
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and came back to determine if the vehicle had been in an accident. (2/11 /13 Tr., p. 7,
Ls.11-16.) As he came back by the place where the vehicle had been parked, the
vehicle was moving and was now driving ahead of him. (2/11/13 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 14-19.)
Officer Woodward followed the vehicle as it circled the block, and he pulled the vehicle
over when the driver failed to signal as it pulled off the road near its original location.
(2/11/13 Tr., p.7, L:12- p.8, L. 11; 4/30/13 Tr., p.187, L.21 - p.188, L.1.) The driver,
Arnold Dean Anderson, admitted that he was driving on a suspended license. (2/11/13
Tr., p.8, L.22 - p.9, L. 15.) Mr. Anderson told the officer that he was trying to sell the
car and that his passenger was interested in buying the vehicle so he had driven him
around the block to give him a chance to see the vehicle in operation. (2/11/13 Tr., p.9,
L..16-p.10, L.1.)
As Officer Woodward was speaking with Mr. Anderson, he noticed a brown paper
bag of the type typically used to store alcohol near the center console.
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-9; 4/5/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-22.)
alcohol in the bag.

(2/11 /13

He asked Mr. Anderson if there was

(2/11/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-13; 4/5/13 Tr., p.10, L.25, p.12, Ls.1-2;

Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.)

Mr. Anderson responded affirmatively.

(2/11/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-14; 4/5/13 Tr., p.11, L.1, p.12, Ls.1-2; Suppression Hearing
State's Exhibit 1.) Officer Woodward asked Mr. Anderson if the bottle of alcohol was
open. (4/5/13 Tr., p.11, L.2; Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) Mr. Anderson then
turned to his passenger to ask if the bottle of alcohol was open, and then he told the
officer "he said yeah." (4/5/13 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-1 O; Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1
(2:00).) Mr. Anderson took the bottle out of the bag and Officer Woodward observed
that the bag contained a bottle of whiskey with the cap on, but the seal on the bottle had
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been broken and

<1

portion of the alcohol was missing.

(2/11/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.15-22;

4/5/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12; 4/30/13 Tr., p.178, Ls.18-23.) Officer Woodward removed
Mr. Anderson from the vehicle and placed him under arrest for driving on a suspended
license.

(2/11/13 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.1 ·1, L. 3.)

Mr. Anderson was handcuffed and

placed in Officer Woodward's police car. (2/1'1/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.2.-3; 4/30/13 Tr., p.179,
Ls.13-15.)

When Officer Woodward was searching Mr. Anderson's vehicle for

additional open containers, he opened the driver's side door and saw a small plastic
container sitting on the floorboard between the seat and the door. (2/11 /13 Tr., p.12,
Ls.1-6, p.11, Ls.9-1 O; Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) The plastic container was
sitting upright and contained a white residue that tested positive for methamphetamine.
(2/1·1t13 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-21.) A baggie containing marijuana was also found in H1e center
console of the vehicle.

(2/11/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-23.)

Mr. Anderson was charged by

Information with felony possession of a controlled substance, and with a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.55-57, 91-94.)
On March 19, 2013, Mr. Anderson filed a motion to dismiss and/or a motion to
suppress evidence and a memorandum in support.

(R., pp.96-103.)

Mr. Anderson

sought suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search of his
vehicle. (R., pp.96-103.) A hearing was held on Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress,
during which the district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript. 1
(4/5/13 Tr.)
The district court ultimately denied Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress finding
that the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle for the purpose of finding

3

additional instrumentalities of the crime of open container.

(R., pp.118-126.)

The

district court noted that the critical inquiry was whether Officer Woodward had probable
cause to believe that there were other open containers of alcohol in the vehicle.
(R., p.121.) The district court held that, "[g]iven that both [occupants] denied ownership
of the bottle of whiskey that was between them near the console, a reasonable and
prudent officer would have good reason to believe that there could be other evidence of
a crime-another open bottle of alcohol-in the car. Moreover, given this inconsistency,
and further given Anderson's hesitation in answering Woodward's question about drugs,
a trained officer would have an objective basis to believe there was a 'probability or
substantial chance' of other crimes, such as drug possession, in the car." 2 (R., pp.121122.)
A one day jury trial was held after which the jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of
possessing a controlled substance.

(4/30/13 Tr., p.255, Ls.19-24; R., p.191.)

Mr. Anderson admitted that he had been convicted of two prior felonies and was thus a
"persistent violator" pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2514. (4/30/13 Tr., p.259, L.9 - p.260,
L.5.)

The district court took judicial notice of the transcript of the preliminary hearing at the
outset of the suppression hearing. (4/5/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.10-15.)
2 The audio recording included a series of questions Officer Woodward asked of
Mr. Anderson while he was handcuffing him and frisking him prior to placing him in the
police car. (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1.) The officer asked Mr. Anderson if
there was anything illegal in the vehicle, and Mr. Anderson responded no. (Suppression
Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11:13-11:14).) Officer Woodward then said, "[t]ook you a
while to respond." (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :14).) This exchange was
not identified by either party in the preliminary hearing or the suppression hearing as
information contributing to the officer's decision to search the vehicle. The district court
apparently learned of this exchange only after reviewing the audio recording sometime
after the suppression hearing.
1

4

The district court sentenced Mr. Anderson to a unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed.

(R., pp.235-246.)

A Judgment of Conviction was entered on

November 26, 2013 and an Amended Judgment of Conviction was entered on
November 27, 2013. (R., pp.235-246.) On December 3, 2013, Mr. Anderson filed a
notice of appeal. (R., pp.247-251, 257-262.)
On March 17, 2014, Mr. Anderson filed a timely pro se Rule 35 motion asking the
district court to reconsider the sentence it imposed. (On ICR 35 Motion Correction or
Reduction of Sentence, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.)
On April 9, 2013, the district court issued a written order denying Mr. Anderson's I.C.R.
35 motion without a hearing.

(Order Denying Defendant's ICR 35 Motion Without a

Hearing, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.)

5

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
upon Mr. Anderson in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to reduce
Mr. Anderson's sentence pursuant to his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Anderson asserts that Officer Woodward did not have probable cause to

search his vehicle.

As such, Mr. Anderson's right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution 3 was violated. Therefore, the
district court erred in denying Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress.

Relevant Jurisprudence and Standards Of RevieV'{

8.

In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, Idaho appellate
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review: the Court will accept the trial court's
findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, but the Court will freely review the
trial court's application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v. Purdum,
147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009).
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a
few narrowly drawn exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455
( 1971 ).

One such exception is the so-called "automobile exception" wherein officers

may search a vehicle, or the contents thereof, if probable cause exists to believe that

3

The attorney who presented and argued Mr. Anderson's suppression motion made a
general argument under both the Idaho and the United States Constitutions, but did not
assert that the Idaho Constitution provides different or increased protection. (R., p.100.)
Therefore, Mr. Anderson will rely upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this appeal.
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the automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991 ); State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894, 898 (1991 ). The state may overcome this presumption by demonstrating
that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Weaver,
127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). The probable cause necessary to justify a search of an
automobile is the same probable cause that is necessary to convince a magistrate to
issue a search warrant, that is: facts available to the officer at the time of the search
would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that area or items to be
searched contained contraband or evidence of a crime.

United States v. Ross, 456

U.S. 798, 823 (1982); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Probable cause does
not require an actual showing of criminal activity, but only the probability or substantial
chance of such activity.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243, n.13 (1983); State v.

Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 600 (Ct. App. 2010).

"Probable cause for a search is a

flexible, common-sense standard-a practical, non-technical probability that incriminating
evidence is present[.]" State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 182-83 (2005).

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress As
Mr. Anderson's Purportedly Slow Response Was Insufficient To Establish
Probable Cause To Search The Vehicle
The district court erred in denying Mr. Anderson's Motion to Suppress.

Mr. Anderson contends that the district court erred in finding that Officer Woodward had
reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Anderson's vehicle contained evidence of
drugs based on what the officer believed was a slow response to his question to
Mr. Anderson, "Is there anything illegal in the vehicle?" (Suppression Hearing State's
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Exhibit 1 (11 :13)).

In ruling on Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress, the district court

erred when it he!d that the denials of ownership of the alcohol, combined with
Mr. Anderson's slow response to Officer Woodward's question of whether there were
drugs in the vehicle, warranted an objective basis to believe there was evidence of other
crimes, such as drug possession, in the car. 4 (R., p:I22.)
When officers effectuate a traffic stop, the detention of the driver must be based
on reasonable suspicion and "must also be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56,
59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The Idaho Supreme Court has held it does not necessarily violate
the Fourth Amendment for an officer to ask unrelated questions about drugs and
weapons during the course of a lawful traffic stop. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563
(2005). However, the duration of a traffic stop cannot be extended once the purpose of
the stop is completed. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 64 7, 650 (Ct. App. 2002). There
are two exceptions to this rule. One such exception is present if the officer observes
objective, specific, and particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of
criminal activity, the purpose of the stop may evolve, allowing the otherwise
impermissible extended detention and investigation. See, e.g., State v. Brumfield, 136
Idaho 913, 916 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Further, an officer's explanation for the search is not
controlling-the lawfulness of the search is to be evaluated by the court, based upon an
objective assessment of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the
search. State

v.

Newman, 149 Idaho 596,599 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010).

4

The State never argued that this exchange contributed to or in any way affected the
determination of probable cause to search the vehicle. (See 2/11 /13 Tr.; 4/5/13 Tr.;
R., pp.106-116.)
9

Particularized suspicion consists of two elements: (1) the assessment must be
based on a totality of the circumstances, and (2) the assessment must yield a
particularized suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in
wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981); State v. Bordeaux, 148
Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2009). A mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion on the part of the
officer is insufficient to trigger this exception. See State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64
(Ct. App. 2009).
Although the district court found that the denials of ownership of the bottle of
alcohol, combined with Mr. Anderson's slow response to Officer Woodward's question
regarding drugs, warranted "an objective basis to believe there was a 'probability or
substantial chance' of other crimes, such as drug possession, in the car," such a finding
was unreasonable.

(R., p.122.) Simply because the driver is slow to respond to an

officer's inquiry as to whether there are drugs in the vehicle does not give rise to a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle contains drugs, particularly where the
vehicle was pulled over for a traffic violation and the only indication of non-driving
criminal activity dealt with alcohol, not drugs. Here, Officer Woodward had only a hunch
of criminal activity, which means he could not have had the necessary probable cause
to search the vehicle. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819-20 (2008) (discussing
officers' hunches and the impropriety of basing searches thereon).

Further, Officer

Woodward testified that he searched the vehicle for other open containers of alcoholhe did not testify that Mr. Anderson's slow response to his question about illegal items in
the car factored into his decision to search the vehicle.

(2/11/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.9-10;

Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :01 ).) Nor did the officer testify that, in his
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training and experience, a delay or hesitation in responding

to

a question makes it likely

that a person would have contraband in his/her vehicle. (See 2/11 /13 Tr.; 4/5/13 Tr.)
An objective assessment of the circumstances with which Officer Woodward was
confronted at the time of the search did not justify a search of the vehicle. Only two
facts were relied upon by the district court in evaluating the totality of the circumstances:
(1) both occupants denied ownership of the previously opened container, and (2)
Mr. Anderson was slow to respond to the officer's question about drugs.

(R., p.122.)

Because these facts even when combined, do not equate to substantial and competent
evidence of probable cause to believe a crime involving drugs had been or was about to
be committed, the district court's conclusion was erroneous.
Further, it is not possible to reconcile the district court's finding of fact with the
information contained in the audio recording. The district court mistakenly recalled the
question asked by Officer Woodward as a question of whether there were drugs in the
car; however, the question was actually, "Is there anything illegal in your vehicle."5
(Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :11 )). Thus, the district court's factual finding
was clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.
Additionally, it is not possible to reconcile the district court's finding of fact with
the actual length of time it took for Mr. Anderson to respond to Officer Woodward's
question because there was no noticeable delay. Mr. Anderson took approximately one
second to respond to the question. (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :13)). On

5

In its Memorandum Opinion, the district court recalled the exchange, "Woodward
asked Anderson if there were drugs in the car. He 'hesitated' and responded 'no."' (R.,
p.119.) The district court also noted that the exchange took place before Officer
Woodward searched the car. (R., p.119, n.1.)
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the audio recording, Officer Woodward said, "[t]ook you a while to answer that
question"; however, this was an exaggeration.

(See Suppression Hearing State's

Exhibit 1 (11:12-11:13)). Thus, the district court's finding that Mr. Anderson delayed in
responding to the question was erroneous.
Assuming arguendo, that Mr. Anderson's response was slow, a slow response or
hesitation in answering does not constitute probable cause or even reasonable
suspicion to believe that Mr. Anderson's car contained drugs or evidence of a crime. In
fact, any search pursuant to what Officer Woodward subjectively felt was a slow
response to his question was based solely on a hunch, which does not qualify as an
exception to the warrant requirement. For example, under United States v. Wood, 106
F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997), a defendant's nervousness, even combined with his criminal
history involving drug use, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Similarly, in

State v. Henage, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the frisk was illegal because the
defendant's nervous appearance did not justify the search.

143 Idaho 655, 661-62

(2007). In fact, such a reaction was likely due to nervousness, which alone cannot give
rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hall, 978 F.2d
616 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding nervousness or hesitation when responding to questions
did not give rise to reasonable suspicion); United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064 (10 th
Cir. 1995) (holding defendant's nervous demeanor could have created nothing more
than a "hunch" on the part of the agents).
Ultimately, Officer Woodward's description of his suspicion reveals had no more
than a "hunch" that Mr. Anderson's vehicle contained drugs, based solely upon the
length of time it took Mr. Anderson to respond to a question when Mr. Anderson's
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response was not dilatory. (Suppression Hearing State's Exhibit 1 (11 :13-11 :14)) Thus,
the district court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous and not based on substantial and
competent evidence.

D.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress As
Officer Woodward Did Not Have Probable Cause To Believe That Evidence Of
Further Criminal Activity VVould Be Found In The Vehicle
In denying the motion, the district court found persuasive the fact that both of the

vehicle's occupants denied ownership of the previously opened bottle of whiskey
located between them.

(R., pp.121-122.)

Based on this fact, the district court

concluded that Officer Woodward had reason to beiieve another open bottle of alcohol
may be found in the car. (R., pp.12'1-122.) However, denial of ownership of one large,
previously opened, container of alcohol does not equate to a reasonable belief that
there are multiple open containers of alcohol elsewhere in the vehicle.

The district

court's determination was erroneous.
The district court found that, "[g]iven that both [occupants] denied ownership of
the bottle of whiskey that was between them near the console, a reasonable and
prudent officer would have good reason to believe that there could be other evidence of
a crime-another open bottle of alcohol-in the car." (R., pp.121-122.) However, such
a conclusion does not logically follow this fact. Simply because there are two occupants
in a vehicle and both of them deny ownership of an open container found in a brown
paper bag between them does not lead to any reason to believe there would be other
open containers in the vehicle. That is, one open container does not beget additional
open containers. Further, because the open container was of whiskey, it is even less
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likely that additional open containers would be found in the vehicle, compared with a
situation in which several cans of beer were missing from a six pack.
Merely because there is a previously opened bottle of hard alcohol, in a bag, in
the front seat between two occupants, does not give rise to an objectively reasonable
belief that the vehicle contains additional bottles of opened alcohol; thus, Officer
Woodward's search of the vehicle for additional open containers of alcohol was not
objectively reasonable.

E.

The District Court Erred In Den in Mr. Anderson's Motion To Su

ress

For the reasons stated above, Mr. Anderson asserts that the search of his vehicle
was unlawful and, thus, violated his Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Anderson asserts that the discovery of
the evidence used against him was the product of his unlawful search and should have
been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). Therefore, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his motion to suppress.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Anderson To A
Unified Sentence Of Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, Following His Conviction For
Felony Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Mr. Anderson asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
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offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 77·1 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. .Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Mr. Anderson does not allege

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishmmrt are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.

In light of Mr. Anderson's rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing him excessively. The district court failed to consider the fact
that, with programming, Mr. Anderson could likely be successful in the community.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl), 6 p.18.) Notably, the presentencing
investigator recommended a retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.18.)
Mr. Anderson has not had an easy life.

Mr. Anderson was verbally and

physically abused by both of his parents. (PSI, p.13.) He left home at age twelve and
rode trains to different states and worked in fields to provide for himself. (PSI, pp.13,
18.)

6

References to the "PSI" shall include the entire electronic file, including all attachments
such as letters in support, substance abuse evaluations.
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However, Mr. Anderson values his children and enjoys spending time with his
grandchildren.
community.

(PSI, pp.13-14, 17.) Further, he has the support of members of his

(PSI, p.42.) The fact that Mr. Anderson has strong support from family

members and friends should have received the attention of the district court.

See

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who

had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Anderson asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his difficult childhood and his dedication to
his famiiy, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

111.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Declined To Reduce Mr. Anderson's
Sentence In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35 Motion
In Mr. Anderson's Rule 35 motion, he asked the district court to correct or reduce
his sentence. (On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of Sentence, p.1, attached to
the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) In support of his Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Anderson submitted several documents regarding his case.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994 ).

"The criteria for examining rulings denying the

requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
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the defondant rnust later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id. "When presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
In his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Anderson informed the court that the prosecutor's
statements during the sentencing hearing regarding his failure to comply with an order
to complete a court compliance program were untrue, as Mr. Anderson was never
ordered to complete the program.

(On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of

Sentence, p.2, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.)
Mr. Anderson asked the district court to consider the importance of his grandchildren to
him.

(On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of Sentence, p.4, attached to the

Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) Further, Mr. Anderson advised the district
court that he was concerned that the apartment complex he had worked hard to
renovate and clean up would be lost if he were incarcerated for a lengthy period of time.
(On ICR 35 Motion Correction or Reduction of Sentence, pp.3-4, attached to the Motion
to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.) However, the district court denied Mr. Anderson's
motion without a hearing.

(Order Denying Defendant's ICR 35 Motion Without

a

Hearing, pp.1-6, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on March 27, 2015.)
Mr. Anderson asserts that the district court's refusal to reduce his sentence represents
an abuse of discretion.
In addition to the new information provided in his Rule 35 motion, the district
court was aware of other mitigating circumstances, as set forth in Section II. Based on
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the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at the time
of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce
Mr. Anderson's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the district court's judgment of conviction and reverse the order which
denied his motion to suppress. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court
reduce his sentence or vacate his conviction and remand this matter for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 2ih day of March, 2014.
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